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Abstract
Background: Within the context of applied bioethical reasoning, various conceptions of the
human body are focused upon by the author in relation to normative notions of autonomy.
Results: The author begins by descriptively exploring some main positions in bioethics from which
the "body" is conceptualized. Such positions conflict: the body is that which is constitutive of the
individual's experience and perception, or it is conceived of materially or mechanistically; or as a
constructed locus, always historically and culturally transformed. The author goes on to suggest a
methodological approach that dialectically considers embodiment from four different perspectives:
as bodily self-determination, as respect for the bodily unavailability of the other, as care for bodily
individuality; and lastly, as acknowledgement of bodily-constituted communities. These four
perspectives encompass autonomy in two of its main interpretations: as the capability of a person
to act independent of external forces, and as the moral ideal of pursuing individual wishes by means
of role distance, self-limitation and universalization. Various bioethical cases are utilized to show
how the four perspectives on the body can complement one another.
Conclusion: The way we consider the body matters. The author's dialectical method allows a
premise-critical identification and exploration of bioethical problems concerning the body. The
method is potentially applicable to other bioethical problems.
Introduction
During the 1970s, a number of performance artists
shocked the public by making their bodies the subject of
artistic performances. By being thus displayed, the body
itself becomes both the medium of the artistic work and
the scene on which it takes place. In the performance
Zerreißprobe (1970) the Austrian artist Günter Brus
injured himself by cutting his head and thigh with a razor
blade. The vulnerability of the flesh was to be shown by
means of the extreme display of a body disfigured by pain
and by interventions from the outside. Brus' perfomance
at the same time was intended to demonstrate limits and
extremes. The American Chris Burden had his left arm
shot by a friend in the course of the performance Shoot
(1971), though the focus here was less on the vulnerabil-
ity of the body than on the examination of ideals of mas-
culinity and insensitiveness to pain as a test of courage.
The French artist Orlan has been causing sensation since
the 1990s by describing her body as "software" and
declaring surgical operations on her face to be "art made
of flesh and blood". In the course of these operations she
regards herself as a living sculpture and "takes the liberty
to experiment with her own body" [1].
In the 1970s, the liberty to be in charge of one's own body
was discussed in another, quite different context as well:
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under the slogan "My body belongs to me!", thousands of
women took to the streets in Germany, Britain, and the
United States to demand a liberalization of the then exist-
ing abortion laws. These concerns and procedures – differ-
ent as they may appear at first glance – point to the same
important problem, namely the unclear or questionable
relationships between the body, the self-determination of
one and the same person, and its public articulation:
What am I allowed to do with my own body, and to what
extent can I permit others to do 'whatever they like' with
their bodies?
Emerging from these public discussions of the 1970s, we
may ask whether these concerns and questions are still rel-
evant for recent bioethical debates. Both examples, mod-
ern performance art and political demonstrations, have
pointed to the political and social dimension of these
questions, as especially 'external' power over the body was
criticized. However, in the early 1970s many people did
not understand these primarily as ethical questions. It was
for many deemed as self-evident that the body is an object
of self-determination and action. Bioethics itself, under-
stood as the systematic consideration of ethical problems
and ethical judgments on the basis of rational argumenta-
tion, was in its infancy at this time [2]. It was only in the
1990s that many scholars started to criticize the neglect of
the body in academic bioethics (e.g. [3-5]). Additionally,
in recent years, a "body boom" in media studies, history
and social science has occurred. According to Anne Witz
[6] the "corporeal turn" in sociology and feminism has
emerged from a critique of the exclusion of certain bodies
(such as women, disabled persons or elderly people) from
the academic discourse. These should now no longer be
neglected.
Additionally, one can call into question the tendencies of
both analytical metaethics and also moral philosophy, as
both center around notions of 'personhood', 'rationality',
'preferences' and 'self-determination' which are mainly
conceptualized without any relation to the body,
although bioethics often deals with problematic cases in
which entities lack rationality and specific mental capaci-
ties, for example embryos, brain-dead patients, animals
and so on. Thus, Margrit Shildrick [7] critically remarks
that "bioethics is out of touch ... with bodies themselves,
in the phenomenological sense in which the being, or
rather the becoming, of the self is always intricately inter-
woven with the fabric of the body." (p. 1f).
Of course, international academic bioethics has itself
developed into a multifaceted discipline, with mutual
relationships between moral philosophy, sociology of sci-
ence and clinical ethics. Thus, generalizations are always
problematic. Nevertheless, I think it is not totally wrong
to state that many scholars in applied ethics and bioethics
still tend toward – as Shildrick calls them – 'conventional',
positions which stress "fixed standards of judgement" [7]
(p. 3). One of these standards is the value of autonomy
and self-determination. Another common strand often
favored by partisans of liberal self-determination sees the
human body as an 'object' and as 'property' subject to per-
sonal, self-determined disposal. For example, the moral
claim that "Every person should decide for themselves
whether they want to donate their organ" is built upon the
assumption that organ donation should be decided on by
the donor themselves, seeing the body as 'property' or as
a 'material object'. In contrast, postmodernism, or as Shil-
drick [7] puts it, postconventional ethics, sees the body as
"leaky, uncontained, and uncontainable" (p. 7). From
this vantage, the body is neither separable from the self
nor from other embodied selves (p. 6). Many postmod-
ernists also criticize the idea of thinking about the body as
property, as an economic value, or as an instrument. (see
e.g. [8,9])
Precisely in the field of body modification and bioethics
we observe a clash of perspectives – in two ways. In the
first place, there is a serious difference in the normative
way of ethical judgment; secondly, there is a difference in
how the body and embodiment are addressed. This dis-
tinction between mainstream bioethics and postconven-
tional sociology and ethics could be difficult to overcome
as long as both insist upon their "rightness".
However, in order to understand bioethics in a broader
sense, as an academic discipline, sweeping aside for one
moment social and political power plays in the academic
world, it should be a basic interest for each and everyone
to hear and to understand what the others are saying. This
could be partly achieved by choosing a method of ethical
reasoning which is open for the various, and sometimes
conflicting views, and this paper is a first attempt at pre-
senting such a method. It is hereby necessary to state that
according to my understanding, normative bioethics is a
systematic, processual method of ethical judgment (see
[10]). It includes the description of an ethical problem,
the analysis of underlying terms and opinions in the light
of theories and practical experience, and finally an ethical
evaluation or a recommendation on how to act. (Whether
this is only true for problem-solving ethics or also for
moral philosophy in a general sense I cannot discuss
here). In this paper, I focus mainly on the issue of "prob-
lem definition"; an issue that is necessarily crucial for all
kinds of moral analyses and for final evaluation. This
understanding of bioethics is applicable to 'conventional'
deontological, utilitarian and postconventional (such as
care-ethics) perspectives. (What matters for each distinct
position are the following decisions: Who do we identify
as the relevant actors? What are the relevant values? And
finally: What is our justification for them?). Thus, the aimPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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of this paper is not to discuss postmodernism itself.
Instead, I intend to critically reflect on mainstream medi-
cal ethics (which I see myself as a part of) and I want to
show why and where some of the postmodern observa-
tions are very important and helpful.
In the first section, I want to show that the socio-historical
and phenomenological approach on the one hand and
'conventional' bioethics on the other cross each other (not
only, but most prominently) in the debate about 'bodily
limits' and 'transgressing body borders'. Conventional
bioethics especially could profit from socio-historical and
empirical-phenomenological investigations of these phe-
nomena because they help clarify descriptive or anthropo-
logical premises about the 'body'. Hence, I want to argue
that – independently of the way in which the body is
described in bioethics, whether as material and distinct
from mind or as dynamic and socially interconnected –
we always deal with a value-laden phenomenon. Instead
of seeking to avoid hidden moral assumptions, I suggest a
methodological approach of making them explicit. By
relating the contrary positions to one another dialecti-
cally, heuristic use can be made of the recent dichotomies
in bioethics. I have chosen for this purpose 'autonomy',
one of the central conceptions of contemporary U.S.
American and Mid-European bioethics. A 'conception'
means here an abstract notion or system of thoughts
which is bundled in a term. However, such a term could
be conceptualized in various ways. Thus, 'autonomy' cov-
ers several aspects of self-determination, such as the
opportunity for free decision, but also the capacity of vol-
untary self-limitation [11]. I develop four different nor-
mative perspectives of how autonomy and embodiment
could be interlinked. I suggest that these recent concep-
tions of bodily autonomy could complement one
another, instead of our presupposing only 'one' right
view. This allows, in my understanding, an improvement
to bioethical normative reasoning, and also helps ethicists
interested in concrete problem-solving start right from the
beginning with a critical sensitivity to their own premises
on what autonomy and the body 'mean'. In a third step, I
want to provide an outlook on how my suggested method
broadens our way of asking ethical questions by discussing
briefly three examples chosen from the fields of transplan-
tation medicine, neuroprosthesis and cosmetic surgery.
The chosen examples should also show that the way we
consider the body in bioethics is not only an issue relevant
for women's health or reproductive medicine [12], but for
all topics in bioethics. The aim of the approach is to be
open to multi-dimensional categories in order to advance
the identification and description of bioethical problems.
Results
Part 1: The Body in ethical, social and historical 
considerations of medicine
The body is more than the locus
Of course, the body has always been and will always be
the physical object of medical interventions and biomed-
ical innovations, and it is therefore already included in
bioethical thought [3]. Within the medico-ethical canon
of non-maleficience, of risk aversion, of healing and care,
the body as soma/the body as physicality is always
involved as a 'locus' (where the intervention or the action
takes place). Eventually, the bioethical discussion's pri-
mary focus on the body happens in the context of the veto
right to bodily integrity or as moral concerns about 'suffer-
ing', often understood as a physical state. Both foci feature
a predominantly instrumental relation to the body,
because the body is regarded as a carrier of, or vehicle for,
the decisive wishes, preferences or interests of a person.
The understanding of the body as socially or culturally
constructed or negotiated plays no role either for the jus-
tification of veto rights or for the situation of physical suf-
fering. For example, in the case of 'suffering', the search for
physiological parameters and quasi-objective criteria to
measure it (as is a hot topic in animal ethics) refers to the
'natural', materialistically-conceived body. This concep-
tion, which has been described as the 'absent body' [5], is
based on the assumption that the generation and validity
of wishes and interests can be analyzed on the basis of the
physical body alone without reference to the body in its
social and phenomenological meaning. According to
Leder [13], this is due to the after-effects of Cartesian dual-
ism and its materialist conception of the body as a
machine. The human being and its personality were
located exclusively within the bodiless spirit. But further
contexts are also important. On the one hand, many writ-
ers mention the individual "constitutions of meaning qua
the body" [14]. Embodiment is regarded as experienced
body sensation, whereby the body is understood as the
scene of the immediate, of the pre-reflexive or of life's tak-
ing place, in the context of individual actions, perceptions
and experiences in their role for human self-understand-
ing [15,13]. (The idea of embodiment must not be used
interchangeably with the idea of naturalness, as especially
the boundaries between nature and culture remain
unclear with respect to the body.) According to the early
phenomenological tradition of Max Scheler (1913) [16],
the German language allows for a distinction between
"Körper" and "Leib", which relates to the difference
between "thing body" (or "flesh") and "lived body". This
distinction highlights some Cartesian presumptions, but
is not identical with the body-mind-distinction. Later,
Merleau-Ponty [11] pointed rather to the ambiguity of the
lived body as ["corps propre"] – an intermediate between
flesh and the body as it is subjectively experienced by the
mind.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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On the other hand, scholars from history and social sci-
ence stress the "historicity of the body". In this stance, we
should pay more attention to the social and historical
contingency and flexibility of the localization of percep-
tion, and of the description and disciplining of the body.
The understanding of the body as socially constructed
'corporality' is interpreted as a historically and culturally
relative variable [17,18]. Following Donna Haraway [19]
body images are of linguistic nature and do not represent
the real body but are in fact 'objects of knowledge'. How-
ever, a very radical socio-constructivist approach would
eliminate this perspective on the body as well. The con-
ception of a (totally) flexible and ambivalent body
reduces the body to nothing, or to a mere space for projec-
tion. In postmodern transhumanism the body is often not
ascribed a value of its own. Within the phenomenological
approach, embodiment as an entity in its own right is seen
as giving immediacy and materiality to individuals and
societies, and as thus constitutive for human self-under-
standing. With this approach, the precarious nature of
conceptualizing the body becomes obvious. Phenome-
nology points to the already implicit normative signifi-
cance of the body and the discussions about what should
be done with, and made of it [14]. Although one could
fear that the loss of certainty concerning our body may
result in a new form of absence of the body, the socio-cul-
tural and poststructural criticism allows us to open our
reasoning in further directions, such that we can now
reflect on the one hand on the phenomenological per-
spective of perception and experience of embodiment and
on the other hand on the perspective on the body as cor-
porality that sees it as formed by culture, socialization or
the history of science.
Since the goal of this article is to develop an approach
which is open for different premises and perspectives
regarding the body, I do not want to restrict my definition
to one theoretical strand. Therefore, I suggest using the
term "embodiment" to encompass the different perspec-
tives.
Body limits as moral and epistemic uncertainties
What is of interest here is that both of the last mentioned
approaches question the certainty of the claim that the
body is only the physical locus of medical interventions
on a theoretical level, while medicine and biotechnology
question this certainty on a practical, everyday level. I sug-
gest that the "body boom" continues because the time we
live in chooses transgressions between bodies and also
categories (in the sense of playing with limits) as a focal
point for technical innovations and social designs of life
(see also [7]). The body boom is a result of the experi-
enced and conscious play with the limits of the body.
However, the reactions to this are quite ambivalent.
Whereas some free such transgressions from taboos by
describing them as a logical consequence of technological
development [20], or even demand them, as the so called
transhumanists do, others lament the (often hidden)
increasing danger for both society and the individual
posed by the new technical domination of the body and
its perfection towards the elimination of finiteness [21].
From an ethical point of view it remains to be analyzed
whether, for instance, our intuition is morally wrong that
certain forms of utilization of the body are not permitted,
and whether certain practices must necessarily be judged
as a morally problematic instrumentalisation of the body.
It is my thesis, though, that such an ethical analysis will
have to consider the anthropological and epistemological
premises that form the basis for the relationships between
embodiment and normative values. The following three
observations shall serve as an introduction to my consid-
erations of the intertwining of ethical, anthropological
and epistemological dimensions:
1. Certain biomedical procedures (amongst others trans-
plantations and implantations) activate moral intuitions
or discomfort more strongly than others do, and thus raise
questions concerning the normative relevance of the
body;
2. At the same time, technologies that transgress both bor-
ders and 'limits' question the traditional categories of
order of the Western culture (influenced by the Judeo-
Christian Tradition, the Enlightenment and scientific
ideas since the nineteenth century) (see e.g. [22]). This
pertains above all to the following binary categories:
- Nature – culture: this basic distinction, based on Aristote-
lian thinking, is blurred for example, in the case of the cul-
tivation of cells or artificially produced organisms.
- Human person – machine: this distinction is challenged by
manipulation of the mind through brain-implanted chips
and brain-computer interfaces.
- Human being – animal: This Aristotelian and also Judeo-
Christian distinction between humans and animals is
questioned by, for example, the creation of human-ani-
mal-chimeras.
- Internal – external: The nineteenth century idea of physi-
cal and social boundaries is challenged for instance by
questioning the ownership of an explanted organ or of an
embryo created in vitro.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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- Body – mind: the Cartesian distinction between the body
as a machine and the mind as the ratio is challenged for
instance through the transplantations of brain tissue.
3. There are different reactions to the questioning of these
conventional orders:
- There is the naturalist argument, where the body is
understood in a materialist way as irrelevant for the for-
mation of norms. A 'value' of the body can only be estab-
lished by referring to the interests or values of the 'users'
of this particular body;
- There is a constructivist-relativist discussion about the
variety of body conceptions, which either refuses all uni-
versally applicable claims to truth or, in a radical form,
denies the body's materiality;
- A normative, prescriptive relevance of the body is postu-
lated, making of it something resistant and unavailable,
with a value of its own – an end in itself.
Let us consider the first observation. Research in the his-
tory of medicine and culture suggests that the develop-
ment of modern medicine (starting with anatomy,
physiology, cellular pathology, bacteriology and hygiene,
human genetics) has successively turned the human body
into an object, and then dissected, regionalized, localized
and standardized it [23,24]. As a consequence, the body
and its parts tend to be regarded through a view known as
"empiricist materialism" ([3]: 300) and are seen as
exchangeable and open to modification.
Transplantation medicine, for instance, is historically
clearly based on the localization theory of illness that
dates from the mid-nineteenth century [25]. However, the
practice of transplantation medicine could only be estab-
lished on the basis of insights resulting from systemic
immunology in the second half of the twentieth century,
including the knowledge of how to understand and
manipulate several pathways of immunological rejection.
For a long time, the ethical discussion of transplantation
medicine neglected consideration of the transfer of organs
with respect to its integration into the body image and the
union of body and spirit, although there were many soci-
ological and anthropological publications on these issues
(see e.g. [26,27]) The premise of interchangeability as
regards physicality and personal identity was only ques-
tioned in ethics against the background of discussions
about the transplantation of neuronal tissue or even entire
heads [28,29], whereas other body parts were not
regarded as constitutive of identity. Such scientific and
technological objectivation and fragmentation has been
criticized as "de-bodiment of reality" and "ousting from
perception the body itself" [30], and opposed as an atti-
tude that exclusively focuses on control over the body.
This criticism appears to contain the vague (and predom-
inantly implicit) assumption that there exists a true or
authentic perspective on the body-identity-relationship
which one just needs to capture differently, in a new way
[21].
Even if one cannot fully agree with this criticism, it never-
theless hints at a situation that I would classify as paradox-
ical: the mutual relationship between, on the one hand,
still very prominent theoretical premises of objectifica-
tion, fragmentation and blindness towards the (lived)
body within everyday medical practice; and, on the other
hand, socially and politically powerful critiques of
increasingly dominating biotechnologies, which stress
that the body is unique, must be perceived subjectively,
and has independence and resistance.
The second observation concerns the ways in which such
paradoxes or ambivalences are triggered. Traditional
Western Occidental culture distinguishes very clearly
between human being and machine. It characterizes the
human being as a hybrid being that can be located
between the two poles of 'nature' and 'culture', and it aims
at the separation of the 'own' from the 'other' through
individuation. According to my thesis, these poles are not
only becoming blurred in the course of the biotechnolog-
ical revolution, they are increasingly being dissolved. Cer-
tainly in our perception and language, mechanization,
rationalization and instrumentalisation of the body or of
living things increasingly moves the balance of the tradi-
tional order in one particular direction, predominantly
towards materialization [30]. According to the sociologist
Gesa Lindemann [31], certain medical technologies mas-
sively shake the hitherto common distinctions of relation-
ships, namely the differentiation between the social
interaction of two human agents on the one hand, and the
relation of a personal agent and a non-personal object on
the other. Lindemann demonstrates this by reference to
her anthropological investigation of the ambivalent and
sometimes contradictory attitudes of doctors, nurses and
relatives to brain-dead patients in intensive care. Many
bioethical problems result from this kind of situation: the
question of how to treat and care for a brain-dead person
in the clinical setting, whether it is permissible to remove
organs (which will result in heart death) or whether oth-
ers should care for months for a brain-dead pregnant
woman so that the baby may grow and be brought to
term. Conceptual difficulties, already present in identify-
ing and evaluating the distinction between two human
agents or a personal agent and a non-personal object,
became obvious in discussions about the moral status of
entities that transgress borders, for instance hybrid beings
such as so-called chimeras. Such transitions from a loss of
order towards normative evaluations lead to the thirdPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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observation concerning reactions to such loss. The philos-
opher Hilge Landweer [32] has asserted that there are
three very different and partly opposing strategies to place
basic anthropological assumptions within contemporary
images of the world:
a) Through the naturalist approach, the human being is
reduced to a body and understood as a creature that is
determined by physico-chemical processes beyond its
control. Consequently, a person's self-relation would be
nothing more than a complex neurophysiological process
which could be changed and manipulated accordingly.
b) In the constructivist or postconventionalist approach,
the essence of the human being can only be explained
through historical and cultural discourses and contexts.
Objective descriptions of the 'body' are no longer possi-
ble. There are only provisional 'truths' (see [7]: 5). And
their analysis is reduced to the description of a series of
conflicting and dispersed discourses. At last, the material-
ity of the body could be understood as a discourse, itself,
depending on narrations of the 'body'.
c) In the "transformation"-approach, the materiality of
the body is assumed, yet embodiment is seen as inaccessi-
ble for and through science. The body (as the sensual
access/interface to the world) is understood as a precondi-
tion of all experience and knowledge. The body's inde-
pendence and autonomy are defended. Despite all
historical and cultural qualifications, this approach does
not entirely neglect universally- applicable statements.
However, the ways in which the body precedes all experi-
ence and knowledge cannot be captured by the terms
'nature' or 'biology', but escape any direct analysis.
My first interim conclusion is that all three positions are
needed to explain how the normative relevance of the
body (e.g. seeing body parts as 'mechanistic spare parts')
is related to other values (e.g. liberty, justice, self-develop-
ment). I hereby distinguish between normativity (pre-
scriptive; as rational ethical justification) and morality
(descriptive; an analysis of values and socio-cultural atti-
tudes in a group of people or society of what is right and
wrong) (see [33]).
Within the naturalist and constructivist positions, the
modification of the body relates to the normative frame-
work of personal interests, social obligations or reciprocal
relational structures as determined for instance by post-
conventional or feminist views. Of all three, the "transfor-
mation"-position is most supportive of the independent
development of the idea of the body as an essentially
'unavailable' entity, with a specific inherent value. The
terms 'unavailable entity' and 'unavailability' are used as
termini technici to characterize normative limitations with
respect to the body. The body must not be objectified and
is never totally disposable for instrumentalisation. This
value in its own right nevertheless needs to enter into
some kind of relation with other norms and values, in
order for positions to be taken from a bioethical perspec-
tive on the various forms of modification of the body.
According to a rather common point of view, whether an
intervention into bodily intactness is morally permissible
depends on the agreement of the person in question to
suffer such an operation, be it the removal of a kidney or
an artistic act as described in the introduction.
I thus want to focus on and discuss the relation of auton-
omy (as one prominent value in bioethics) and embodi-
ment in the next step. This relationship is, in my opinion,
a crucial issue, precisely because one cannot understand
the various positions about the body and its meaning for
the self without some consideration of liberalism, social
conformism and the question of when a human act or
decision is authentic, free and autonomous.
Part 2: More than one relation: embodiment and 
autonomy
Let me give a short overview of two philosophers who
have specifically investigated the relationship of embodi-
ment and autonomy, by criticizing (radical) liberal ten-
dencies in bioethics.
According to Richard Shusterman [34], recent forms of
conformism as well as individualism encourage 'somati-
sation', that is, practical attention paid to the body
(through, for instance, cosmetic surgery, body building,
medical operations, and piercing). There is an explanation
for the positive co-existence of both the cult and the nega-
tion of the body: Both trends are rooted in disrespect for
the body, as concentration on the mere exterior material-
ity of the body does not acknowledge the body's inde-
pendence. The body is no longer perceived as a given fate,
but as raw material at the disposal of individual creativity.
There are, however, some indications as to the dialectics
of these practices: at least in their beginnings, many aes-
thetic body techniques such as tattooing or piercing can
be seen as an individual's expression of resistance against
standards and societal body norms. Similar to sports, they
can also represent a positive body experience which is
obtained through pain. Modifications of the body appar-
ently promise liberties, yet at the same time there is a fear
of the enslavement of the body. Shusterman distinguishes
a 'somatic of presentation' (a manipulation of outward
appearance) and a 'somatic of experience' (new breathing
techniques, psychotherapy etc.). With Shusterman, espe-
cially the former is criticized. This was due to a critical atti-
tude which interprets attention paid to the body as an
already alienated interest in an outward representation,
which would therefore inevitably serve the corrupt aimsPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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of advertising and propaganda [34]. In contrast, Shuster-
man recognizes the somatic of the experience as an option
that can have constitutive potential for identity and har-
mony.
In libertarian ethics, 'autonomy' is, as already shown, the
normative touchstone for many kinds of body modifica-
tion. However, as Christman has shown in depth, there
are various conceptions and interpretations of autonomy
([35,36,36]). In general terms, autonomy is seen as a basic
condition for liberty [37]. Following Carter, the crucial
question is – in order to distinguish between 'negative'
and 'positive' liberty – whether someone is primarily
interested in the degree of external interferences and con-
trols (such as the state, other persons) (=negative liberty)
or whether someone advocates the importance of internal
factors (such as self-commitments or shared social opin-
ions; = positive liberty). Both ideas of liberty focus atten-
tion on the way desires and interest are formed and put
into practice [38], while the content is not considered (see
also [37]. This observation points precisely to the debate
over 'bodily autonomy', a term coined by Catriona Mac-
kenzie [39]. Mackenzie develops an account of the theo-
retical relationships between choice, bodily capacities and
autonomy in order to discuss the content of arguments
concerning wishes and acts that interfere with embodi-
ment and body modifications. She criticizes the notion of
maximal libertarian autonomy that underpins the expan-
sion of available body modifications, rights for body
property and the instrumentalisation of the body for per-
sonal autonomy [39] because she rejects the idea that
maximizing choices automatically increases a person's
autonomy. In addition, she rejects the straight liberal
maximal choice conception because it provides no nor-
mative criteria to assess which choices are autonomy-
enhancing and which are impairing. Here, Mackenzie
seems to refer to a radical libertarian interpretation of 'lib-
eral ethics', while there are liberal ethicists, most promi-
nently John Rawls [40], who also see self-restriction,
fairness and paternalism as parts of a reasonable social
morality and as protecting us from unreasonable first-
order wishes which endanger our second-order wishes.
Referring to a 'relational conception of autonomy', and
following Ricoeur's phenomenological approach, namely
that human corporeality is the invariant condition of
human selfhood, Mackenzie suggests understanding the
body as part of our identity, such that her favored notion
of bodily autonomy – also as a normative theory – always
implies critical reflection on changes of bodily integrity
and accepting the "givens of human embodiment" [39]
(p. 433).
The attraction of Mackenzie's idea lies in its productive cri-
tique of a 'radical' libertarian conception of bodily auton-
omy, as described above. It helps to detect the weak point
of under-complex premises regarding the meaning and
condition of the human body as an instrumental means.
But again, her ambitious conception of bodily autonomy
is itself built upon normative and anthropological
premises which are taken for granted. Instead of the phe-
nomenological position she seems to take as given, I
would suggest that normative reflections on bodily auton-
omy should be grounded on several premises, including
non-phenomenological positions, as they are also promi-
nent in medical practice or radical postmodern thinking.
What follows for my argumentation? Not only conven-
tional liberal bioethics, but also the critiques of these
positions are in need of clarification and justification of
their premises regarding embodiment. I understand this
critique as a fruitful staring point for re-thinking our ini-
tial problem: How do we interpret and conceptualize the
body in bioethics? And, secondly, the current interna-
tional discourse in bioethics has to acknowledge its own
diversity in its use of 'body conceptions'. It is scientifically
unsatisfactory to 'stick' to some views and reject others as
'ideologies'. The several, conflicting assumptions of what
the human body 'is' may result in conflicting ethical judg-
ments. The aim is not so much to overcome all conflicts,
but rather to have an explicit discussion on what the body
means to bioethics and not only in theoretical papers but
also in applied problem-solving ethics. Therefore, I sug-
gest an analytical matrix which allows a self-critical test of
various premises by way of a dialectical composition of
the various views. It is built upon the idea of a critical
reflection of normative and anthropological premises by
contrasting them with alternative or even antagonistic
conceptions of body-autonomy-relationships. This multi-
dimensional approach functions as a heuristic tool to
"identify and test" bioethical assumptions with respect to
different epistemic and anthropological premises regard-
ing the body. At the same time the approach sustains ten-
sion between different notions of autonomy.
To achieve this, I start from a summary of the two polar-
ized main lines concerning the interpretation of 'auton-
omy'. According to Christman ([35,36]), 'autonomy'
refers, on the one hand, to the potential or actual capabil-
ity of a person to act and decide independently of external
influence and power. This avenue is often stressed in lib-
eral argumentation, where self-determination is conceptu-
alized without considering the social influence on norms
and preferences. Its main pursuit would be 'negative lib-
erty' (see above). I prefer to talk of self-determination in
this understanding of autonomy, because the term
stresses the "self" – instead of external determination. On
the other hand, 'autonomy' could mean the moral ideal of
developing values and normative standpoints by means
of criteria of role distance, self-limitation and universali-
zation. This avenue leads in the direction of the abovePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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mentioned 'relational autonomy' in which social respon-
sibility and social relationships are the main entrance into
understanding autonomy. I call it here 'moral autonomy'
to stress the capacity for moral self-reflection, as Macken-
zie (p. 429) does: Moral (bodily) autonomy connects to
the imagining of the good life through critical and creative
self-reflection and the integration of biological, socio-cul-
tural and biographical dimensions of bodily self-represen-
tation. This notion of autonomy also appears to be linked
to the idea of a successful establishment of a coherent
identity, despite fashionable trends and socio-cultural
conformity. Both conceptions of autonomy do not neces-
sarily preclude each other from a normative point of view.
While the liberal 'minimum' conception of autonomy is
understood as a capability to develop and formulate indi-
vidual preferences despite or precisely because of social
influences, the second 'maximum' one is understood as
the capability to question and prioritize one's own prefer-
ences and to use them for orientation with respect of oth-
ers' interests and needs.
According to my analysis in part 1, there are also at least
two main polarized perspectives on the body. These also
may enrich the bioethical debate. On the one hand, there
is the phenomenological perspective which combines
both the perception of the individual's material and
anthropological limitations (the physical dimension) and
the lived-body phenomena such as sensual perceptions or
pain. The other view understands embodiment as a textu-
ally or culturally inscribed 'exterior' (such as categorisa-
tion into specific aesthetic, social, gender or medical-
scientific 'classes' would be). As a result, we now have four
different specific perspectives for the relationship. Each is
based upon one of the specific interpretations of embodi-
ment and autonomy that I have worked out above. The
four perspectives are not hierarchically understood; one
could 'start' reading the matrix from the conventional,
"liberal-materialistic" perspective and end at the "com-
munitarian-deconstructivistic" position, but also vice
versa (I will illustrate this for concrete cases in the next sec-
tion). But in order to avoid misunderstandings, I choose
more adequate labels to describe these four perspectives:
I) "Bodily self-determination"
Autonomy as the right to bodily self-determination refers
in this view to the defense of one's own body against
direct and indirect interventions by third parties. The
body represents the immediate access to one's own per-
sonality (i.e. to 'express' one's own opinion by a body
modification), and at the same time can be regarded
materialistically as a transformable entity. Autonomy
remains fixed to the somatic/bodily- conveyed capabili-
ties of personal identity (i.e. to communication, to coping
with pain, to the conscious realization of personal charac-
teristics). However, this view does not have to lead to the
conclusion that an instrumentalisation of the body always
means an instrumentalisation of the person, provided
that the interventions in question are agreed to by this
person, and the natural basis for this person's identity
remains intact.
II) "Respect for the bodily unavailability of the other"
Moral autonomy, as part of the self-restriction that I have
discussed above, includes the respect for another person's
bodily integrity, even if it conflicts with one's own prefer-
ences and aims of action. This necessitates a critical reflec-
tion on the ways in which one deals with the body of
others and one's own within the social and cultural space.
This respect is more than a negative right to repel claims
of others. It understands respect for others as reciprocity
for the wish to be respected. First and foremost, this
respect for the bodily unavailability of others allows criti-
cal reflection of own needs for other bodies. But it also
includes considerations about one's own body images,
bodily integrity and desires for body modifications. Can
one rightfully deduce certain demands to maintain or
form bodily integrity on this basis, particularly so if this
has implications for third parties? A self-critical view on
body images and ideals could be required if one cannot be
sufficiently sure of avoiding implicit or explicit discrimi-
nation of those who diverge from this ideal. In addition,
moral autonomy can involve taking political-normative
initiative for the bodily integrity of others even if one is
not affected personally. This could be done through advo-
cacy, esp. for those who cannot articulate their own inter-
ests and views. This includes the commitment to political
discussions about the unavailability of the body of third
parties.
III) "Care for bodily individuality"
Autonomy as self-critical reflection includes the fulfill-
ment of individual interpretations of what a good life is
for me, including a form of care and concern for my body.
Therefore, an understanding of the body can be regarded
as part of a conception of the good life: one's own interests
and desires are linked to imaginations of bodily percep-
tion and expression, and to bodily-mediated actions such
as communication, love and sensations. Visions of the
good life include the striving for aesthetic values, and the
development and stabilization of an identity as conveyed
through sexuality, appearance as bodily characteristic and
bodily techniques (such as in the acts of eating or moving
etc.). Such bodily features are always situated within a
complex understanding of individual normality, of polit-
ical and social standardization, and of historical and cul-
tural difference. Embodiment is critically investigated as
socially constructed and discursively negotiable. This
emphasizes and makes comprehensible the role of indi-
vidual care for bodily characteristics: the central norma-
tive element of this care may well be the recognition of aPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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difference rather than of a norm or normality. Care for
bodily individuality goes further than having a maximal
choice for body modification: It also includes the idea that
the self and personhood are built upon individual appear-
ance and individual body language and styling. Care
includes the protection of bodily individuality by main-
taining one's own identity even if one's body appears dif-
ferent and 'strange' to others. Recognition of bodily
individuality could be understood as recognition of being
different (to others). Therefore this need not lead to an
exclusion of the other but can support the fortification of
one's own self-determination through dialogue and a cre-
ative approach to the other. The background to this is the
idea that there exist several ways of dealing with embodi-
ment (and its weaknesses) which serve as sources of ideas
for the conduct of life, and hence of ideas of the good life.
IV) "Recognition of bodily cooperation"
Autonomy as the opportunity and capacity to develop a
self as an autonomous person may at the very least require
the right to one's own social identity within the frame-
work of group membership. This group is assumed to
express itself by means of specific forms of embodiment,
of bodily interaction and of bodily-constituted communi-
ties; and to build a harmonic cooperation, here called
'bodily cooperation'. This recognition is built upon the
care for bodily individuality but refers to forms of bodily
expression in which the body is constitutive for specific
social interactions. The building of stable social relation-
ship such as parenthood, partnerships or friendship could
not easily be thought without having bodily contact
through touching or sharing bodily experience. For
instance, most forms of sexuality are constitutively bodily
social interactions, as are maternity or the social handling
of dead human beings. Recognition of such bodily inter-
action leads to political and social recognition of those
communities which are different in sexual preferences,
e.g. homosexual communities.
Discussion: Increasing sensitivity for various 
normative perspectives of the body
What conclusions can be drawn once we open up these
four perspectives instead of the common narrowing to
only one favored perspective? In the last section, I want to
use the approach developed in part 2 for an improved,
premise-critical description of ethical problems in recent
biomedicine. The chosen examples of issues in transplan-
tation medicine, neuroprosthesis or cosmetic surgery
present serious cases of 'transgressing borders'. Because of
limitations of space, I will restrict the final discussion to
the aim of showing the increased sensitivity to the various
perspectives of normative judgments through different
ways of formulating the starting problem.
I therefore start again from a liberal conception in which
the argument of bodily self-determination is vehemently
used to justify the right to body modification as long as
informed consent is given by the affected person. As long
as biomedical technologies are perceived as means to
achieve emancipation from bodily limitations (through
illness, pain or death) their legitimacy does not seem to be
in doubt. But it is decisive whether new options secure,
impair or increase the preservation of a person's interests
and autonomy through body modifications. For instance
in the case of the transplantation of organs, how is the
freedom of a patient to chose between options as pro-
vided through the medical system safeguarded within the
framework of information, availability of medical treat-
ments and agreement procedures? A special case is the
possible commercialization of the donation of organs.
The argument of bodily self-determination seems to sup-
port a liberalization of the trade in organs as long as it is
guaranteed that possible medical risks are reliably
assessed and made clear to the agent, and that injustice
through possible exploitation is avoided [41]. But in the
same field, we have to consider the understanding of what
constitutes a person, as exemplified by the question
whether self-determination continues beyond a person's
heart death or total or part brain death. Here, the antici-
pated relationship of self-determination and embodiment
(in the sense of an understanding of the body that has to
be interpreted individually) is decisive. Is it a truly per-
sonal affair to decide on what should happen to one's
dead body, or does one need to respect the piety of rela-
tives and therefore accept certain limits? The former dis-
tinction between human being and machine, mind and
body, is blurred by the technology itself (as 'dead' persons
are kept 'quasi-alive' by heart-lung-machines). If a per-
son's autonomy is linked only to current bodily self-deter-
mination and constructs the body as a physical
instrument, further- reaching claims such as the social
obligation to help other patients with organs eventually
succeed, even if the dead person refused the explantation
of organs whilst alive.
But further interesting perspectives appear when bodily
self-determination is complemented with concerns about
the respect for the bodily unavailability of another person.
The constructed case of an individual decision-making
process often cuts out medical and social reality: This
includes questions about the person who serves as an
organ donor or who carries out an operation, for instance
as a doctor. For example, in the case of a living donation
one needs to raise the question as to whether the living
donor of a kidney considers the act of donation as a vol-
untary, autonomous decision, but also whether the poten-
tial organ receiver has a right to ask for the donation. The
transgression of the internal-external-borders ("My kid-
ney in your body?") opens the new field for the moralPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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assessment of identity and bodily integrity. Taking seri-
ously the moral respect for others' bodily integrity opens as
such a new perspective: Doctors, as well as any potential
recipient of the organ have to acknowledge the moral
dimension of their decision (to conduct the operation,
and to receive the organ) and to take responsibility for
their respective roles within the decision-making process.
The critical reflection on the respect for the bodily integ-
rity of the other also allows for a consideration of the
impacts of modern biomedicine on people who are not
directly affected, in terms of a possible discrimination of
third parties. Discriminating with regard to others means
to disadvantage them on the basis of their membership in
a specific group although this specificity does not justify
such inequality in treatment. While the focus on bodily
self-determination neglects the dimension of future social
developments, the respect for bodily unavailability opens
the door for critical social impacts, even if they are indirect
and only a future possibility. Such problems could be
approached by considering slippery-slope arguments.
Cosmetic surgery could hereby be seen as challenge to the
border between what is seen as natural and what is artifi-
cial. While this 'border' is not said to be a distinction
between morally right or wrong, its transgression implies
important questions of authenticity and cultural stand-
ards. For instance cosmetic surgery on an adult woman
very often seems to be legitimated with reference to bodily
self-determination. Taking influential pop cultural shifts
in body images as possible and likely, this may result in a
successive, implicit social compulsion for next genera-
tions to undergo similar modifications of the body. The
moral dimension of such individually legitimate deci-
sions unveils ethical problems for those who are rather
dependent on cultural standards (such as adolescents).
The conception of self-determination is related to a con-
ception of the good life insofar as the fulfilling of single
preferences and second-order interests could be seen as
embedded in the 'whole' perspective of what a person
should be, of what is part of his/her self and identity. The
stabilizing effect of the exclusion of and separation from
others on personal identity should not be underestimated
[42]. This new idea of individual care leads to a positive
effect that stabilizes identity. The role of care for bodily indi-
viduality and its characteristics, for the development of iden-
tity and thus for self-determination is further supported
by the process of individualization and the deconstruc-
tion of fixed socially constructed categories such as
'healthy' and 'ill', 'ugly' and 'beautiful' or 'natural' and
'artificial'. For instance, it allows a more open discussion
of how to assess neuroprosthesis and brain implants to
cope with certain disabilities (such as deafness), Parkin-
son disease (e.g. treated with xenotransplants) or patients
with the Tourette-syndrom (a disorder, which is character-
ized by uncontrollable vocalizations and movement and
treated with deep brain stimulation) (see e.g. [43]). These
biomedical technologies could question the 'border'
between human being and machine or animal. If the body
is seen only as a material basis or as depending on indi-
vidual perception, the bioethical discourse is then poised
on the (empirical) question of whether the prostheses or
xenotransplants are able to change 'personal identity'.
Instead, realizing that the border itself is questionable, on
the one hand, and that normative recognition of bodily
cooperation, on the other hand, may count, alternative
solutions such as the improvement of care and the reduc-
tion of barriers on the social, structural or town-planning
for elderly or mentally ill people will be seriously dis-
cussed. Additionally, this directly opens up issues of dis-
tributive justice: We have to face the problem that
excessive use of biomedical solutions could forget all
those disabled people and patients who – for personal or
structural reasons – do not have access to biomedicine.
Finally, the consideration of the recognition of bodily-consti-
tuted communities and bodily cooperation allows us to ques-
tion whether some biomedical practices could destroy
cultural identities, for instance as signified by a loss of sign
language due to the use of cochlea implants [44], or
whether it also contributes to the gestation of new ones
(through the development of new collectives of patients,
for instance). The normative tension between bodily self-
determination and care for one's bodily individuality
gives rise to a discourse over the extent to which the
acceptance or refusal of an intervention into the body is
rooted in a comprehensible insecurity or desired unavail-
ability with respect to one's own body. Adding the per-
spective of the possible value of bodily-constituted
communities allows new forms of assessing social actions
and communication. Since the debate about race, sexual-
ity, ethnicity and disability, we have seen by way of the
negative effects of embodiment its crucial role in the per-
ception of other 'cultural' identities. For instance, the
social and political dimension of patients' self-help
groups could be better discussed as part of a socio-politi-
cal dimension in the medical system than by focusing on
individual decision-making. Patients support and advise
each other; they share something which not only sepa-
rates them from others, but also strengthens them: the
existential experience of illness or of the long process of
therapy and recovery [45].
Conclusions: The loss of self-evident truths
The opening for various relationships between autonomy
and embodiment provides a central interface for the ethi-
cal reflection about who can decide when and how about
one's own body. What elements of a person can be
regarded as available or unavailable at which points in
time during the process of this person's life or dying?
Some liberal ethicists criticize the 'body boom' in ethics asPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:30 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/30
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a "neo-heathen body cult" [46], because they view it as
inappropriate to refer to the body as morally relevant.
However, as I argued above, this assumption could be
self-contradictory if proponents of the liberal conception
of self-determination recognize the principle of non-
maleficience as a moral duty to act in a responsible way –
as many scholars do. Non-maleficience and the obligation
to reduce suffering are linked to a specific concept of the
body – a body which is able to 'suffer' and 'feel pain' and
can be 'harmed'. Instead of neglecting one's own anthro-
pological and epistemic premises about this suffering
body I suggest to be aware of them. I conclude therefore
that the bioethical procedure of detecting and describing
ethical dilemmas should also take into account the ways
and limits of perceiving one's own body and those of oth-
ers. From here, it should not be concluded that any kind
of biotechnology is morally problematic just because it
annihilates 'difference' (for instance through the idea of
making an 'ill' person 'healthy') nor is it generally justified
just because patients gave their 'free' informed consent.
The body is a challenge for bioethics, because autonomy
as the idea of the 'unavailability' of the body relies on var-
ious premises regarding the manner in which cultural and
personal identity is built upon bodily practices, bodily
constitutions and body images. Within the liberal bioeth-
ical context, bodily self-determination is often under-
stood as a minimal moral consensus based on a legitimate
resistance against medical (or state) paternalism. But as I
showed so far, bioethics provides more than insisting on
this minimal consensus; ethical reflection also serves a
fruitful idea of a reflective self-relation of the moral agent.
This reflection makes it necessary to think about the nor-
mative meaning of specific bodily related interactions
with others and the respect and care for others' bodily
integrity.
However, the categories for the cultural and natural order
of the body as described above are not regarded as having
a moral value in their own right, but as being very value-
laden. Thus, the suggested matrix is open to various inter-
pretations and offers both linguistic and argumentative
access to critical inquiry and to the different ways of being
a lived body or a thing body [30]. One should also note
that the loss of order, as I described the moral and epis-
temic uncertainties towards human bodies in Part 1, is
constantly discussed within the bioethical debate, but is
labeled in a different way: as the conflict about the so-
called 'moral status' of various entities, e.g. of a human
embryo, of animals, or of brain-dead persons.
The loss of self-evident truths may often be regarded as a
specifically modern phenomenon or even as the tragedy
of modernity. Particularly the wider bioethical perspective
shows to which extent epistemological and normative
views are intertwined. However, in the course of self-
reflection this loss can also be seen as something positive:
as an opportunity for self-re-interpretations.
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